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THE POLI-INTEL INDUSTRY:
CONSIDERING THE COMMON LAW'S
APPLICATION IN INSIDER TRADING
UNDER THE STOCK ACT
ERNIE C. JOLLY*
President Barack Obama signed the Stop Trading on Congressional
Knowledge Act ("STOCK Act") into law on April 4, 2012. Congressional
silence on the STOCK Act's purview over the political intelligence industry
and the lack of guidance from the Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC') have led practitioners and scholars to speculate on the STOCK
Act's reach. Due to uncertainty, Congress should clarify its intent behind
the STOCK Act, and the SEC should provide further guidance on the
proper application of its securities laws while considering fundamental
principles of fraud established through common law. Applying common
law principles to political intelligence activity would weed out fraudulent
behavior without having an overbroad impact, a risk enforcement officials
run when applying vague insider trading principles to political intelligence
activity. Ultimately, without further guidance, the STOCK Act's
applicability to political intelligence activities will remain speculative,
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discouraging legitimate interactions with the government that may prove
conducive to efficient capital markets.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 6, 2012, Washington insiders convened for breakfast at Charlie
Palmer Steak Restaurant, only a few blocks from the Capitol Building.'
The morning's discussion, titled "Defining Political Intelligence," 2
examined the future of an opaque industry.3 At the event, panelists defined
political intelligence as the "process for collecting industry policy research"
and "the deliverables of collected information (reports and analysis) sold to
1. See Political Intelligence Panel Discussion Concludes With Recognized Need
for Increased Disclosure of Non-Public Material Collection and Use, Bus. WIRE (June
12, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120612005322
/en/Political-Intelligence-Panel-Discussion-Concludes-Recognized-Increased
[hereinafter Political Intelligence Panel] (summarizing the details of a panel discussion
organized by Washington lobbyists, attorneys, and policy analysts interested in the
political intelligence industry).
2. Id.
3. See generally Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Seeks Same
Transparency from Political Intelligence Professionals as Lobbyists (Feb. 2, 2012),
available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPagelD
1502=38833 (discussing the need for transparency around an obscure industry).
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customers."A
The panel convened approximately two months after President Barack
Obama signed into public law the Stop Trading on Congressional
Knowledge Act ("STOCK Act").5 The STOCK Act reinforces the duty of
trust and confidence owed by congressional members and staffers to
Congress and the American people6 and declares a similar duty within the
other branches of government.7 The law explicitly subjects individuals
employed by the government to liability for trading securities on the basis
of material, nonpublic information obtained through their positions.
Regarding the political intelligence industry, Section 7 of the STOCK
Act merely instructs the Comptroller General of the United States to release
a report on the role political intelligence plays in the financial markets. 9
Despite the STOCK Act's silence on selling policy analysis based on
political intelligence (some of which may be considered "material" and
"nonpublic"), Washington attorneys have speculated that the STOCK Act,
in conjunction with traditional insider trading principles, may already
expose political intelligence professionals to liability.'o
4. Political Intelligence Panel, supra note 1.
5. See Press Release, White House, FACT SHEET: The STOCK Act: Bans
Members of Congress from Insider Trading (Apr. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/04/fact-sheet-stock-act-bans-
members-congress-insider-trading (announcing the enactment of the STOCK Act and
detailing its provisions).
6. See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act),
Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012).
7. See id. § 9 (incorporating employees and officers within the Executive and
Judicial branches under the purview of the STOCK Act by simply compelling the
Judicial Conference of the United States and the Office of Government Ethics to
provide interpretive guidance on standing ethics statutes and regulations).
8. See generally JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 42495, THE STOCK
ACT, INSIDER TRADING, AND PUBLIC FINANCIAL REPORTING BY FEDERAL OFFICIALS
(2012) (breaking the STOCK Act into four major features, including its clarification of
a public official's duty of trust and confidence to the American people, a provision that
opens public officials to insider trading liability).
9. STOCK Act § 7. See generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
13-389, POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE: FINANCIAL MARKET VALUE OF GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION HINGES ON MATERIALITY AND TIMING (2013) (considering the extent to
which investors rely on political information, whether such practices implicate
established securities laws, yet providing no recommendations for legislatures beyond
balancing the costs and benefits of a disclosure regime).
10. See ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, ADVISORY: STOCK ACT EXPANDS INSIDER
TRADING LIABILITY: COMMUNICATING WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CARRIES NEW
RISKS 1-4 (2012), http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents
/Advisory%20STOCK Act Expands_InsiderTradingLiabilityCommunicating with
_GovernmentOfficials_CarriesNewRisks.pdf (advising clients to be more cautious
when using information obtained from federal employees and officials); DAVIS POLK &
WARDWELL LLP, CLIENT MEMORANDUM: THE STOCK ACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR
TRADING ON POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE 1 (2012),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/4af2e74c-700d-4f4e-970f-
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This Note examines the impracticality of applying traditional insider
trading principles to political intelligence activity. Furthermore, it
considers an alternative interpretation of our securities laws' purview over
the political intelligence industry, based on common law understandings of
fraud, while acknowledging the realities of information sharing in
Washington. Finally, it concludes that interpreting the STOCK Act based
on fundamental principles of fraud would provide practical standards for
political intelligence professionals, many of whom engage in legitimate
policy research and analysis that is conducive to efficient capital markets.
I. FROM THE STOCK MARKET'S CRASH TO THE STOCK ACT: AN
EVOLUTION OF SECURITIES LAWS
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("SEA") was a political byproduct
of the stock market's failure during the Great Depression." Concerned
with "ineptitude and/or chicanery" among stockbrokers and investment
bankers, policymakers passed sweeping legislation to restore confidence
within the market. 12
Pursuant to the SEA,'3 the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") promulgated Rule lOb-5, which prohibits individuals from
engaging in deceptive practices in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.14  Although the term "insider trading" is not statutorily
defined, the SEC and courts construe Rule lOb-5 to prohibit "insider
trading"-a phenomenon not limited to corporate insiders, which is
something the term may suggest.'5 Generally, insider trading includes all
8c3f00d63e6c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6edb24cd-f22d-4c36-a4bb-
8d0e9e3f5373/033012_STOCK Act.pdf (advising market participants who engage
public officials to access relationships with such officials before trading in order "to
ensure that there is not a relationship of trust and confidence that could give rise to
insider trading liability based on a misappropriation theory"); Robert L. Walker, The
STOCK Act: Insider Trading on Government Information; Corporate and Individual
Compliance Concerns, WILEY REIN LLP (Apr. 4, 2012),
http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfmsp=articles&id=7953 (suggesting training
on the likely pitfalls the STOCK Act could pose to professionals who obtain market
sensitive information from federal employees).
11. See George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An
Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in 2 THE SELECTED WORKS OF
GEORGE J. BENSTON 66, 66 (James Rosenfeld ed., 2010) (describing how the
Depression-era Congress wanted federal approval of all securities sales and how
President Roosevelt preferred disclosure by corporations who sold their securities).
12. See id. (highlighting the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent Great
Depression as the basis for the subsequent financial reform laws).
13. Securities Exchange Act § 901, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
15. See Robert J. Kuker, Comment, Insider Trading Liability of Tippees and Quasi-
Insiders: Crime Shouldn't Pay, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 295, 295 n.1 (1988)
(analyzing the nonobvious legal interpretation of the phrase "insider trading").
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unlawful trading based on material, nonpublic information, regardless of
whether the trader is a corporate insider.16
Notwithstanding the broad applicability of the SEA, the STOCK Act
represented an expansion beyond our securities laws' original foundation in
fiduciary duty principles.' 7 Consequently, legal scholars and practitioners
have sought ways to best fit political intelligence activity within our
established securities law regime. It has been argued that political
intelligence activity is most susceptible to insider trading liability under the
misappropriation theory as it applies to "tippers" (those who divulge
nonpublic, material information) and "tippees" (those who receive
nonpublic, material information).18 The misappropriation theory, described
in United States v. O'Hagan,1 9 considers trading on material, nonpublic
information unlawful when one owes a duty of trust and confidence to the
source of the information, but not necessarily to the company as a whole.
Courts have held tippers and tippees liable for trading on misappropriated
information when certain requirements are met. 20 Under the tipper/tippee
model, liability is imposed on a tippee when the tipper has breached a
fiduciary duty by divulging material, nonpublic information, and the tippee
knows or has reason to know that the breach has occurred.21 When it is
difficult to determine the extent to which information is material or
nonpublic, however, the otherwise straightforward tippee/tipper liability
rule may be difficult to apply, a difficulty that arises when applying this
rule to the emerging political intelligence industry.
16. See id.
17. See Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serys., 11Ith
Cong. 49 (2009) [hereinafter Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials]
(statement of J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor, George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law)
(providing concerns about the STOCK Act's potential unintended consequences since
it expands insider trading beyond the theory's foundational principles).
18. See The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 81 (2011) (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director
of the Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n) (analyzing the applicability of
insider trading laws to congressional members, staffers, and others who may receive
and trade on material, nonpublic political intelligence).
19. 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (defining the misappropriation theory of insider
trading).
20. David T. Cohen, Note, Old Rule, New Theory: Revising the Personal Benefit
Requirement for Tipper/Tippee Liability Under the Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading, 47 B.C. L. REV. 547, 561-62 (2006) (noting that tipper/tippee liability applies
in the context of the misappropriation theory, although courts are divided on whether a
personal benefit is a necessary element similar to tipper/tippee liability under the
classical theory).
21. See id. (providing the uncontested elements of tipper/tippee liability as it
applies under the misappropriation theory, yet acknowledging elements of the theory
that are still contested in the courts).
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II. THE MOST VEXING ISSUES POSED BY THE STOCK ACT AND THE
IMPRACTICALITY OF APPLYING TRADITIONAL INSIDER TRADING
PRINCIPLES
Congressional silence on the STOCK Act's purview over the political
intelligence industry and no indication of guidance from the SEC led
practitioners to speculate on the STOCK Act's reach.22 Some of the most
vexing issues for practitioners include applying the (1) material and (2)
nonpublic elements of the misappropriation theory to political intelligence
activity.23 This Section will examine the application of these elements in
turn.
A. The Material Element
Depending on the facts, courts approach the materiality element of
insider trading in two different ways. Normally, courts consider whether it
is likely that the inside information "would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of a reasonable investor."24 Contrarily,
when dealing with speculative and/or contingent material information,
courts apply a probability/magnitude test that considers the likelihood of an
anticipated event and its potential financial impact. 25  Scholars anticipate
that the probability/magnitude test is most applicable to political
intelligence activity given the speculative nature of the legislative
process.26
22. See ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 10, at 1-2, 4 (speculating that the
STOCK Act's language may already impose liability on political intelligence
professionals); DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 10, at 2-3 (cautioning that
due to the STOCK Act's language in conjunction with the misappropriation theory, one
should consider the nature of the information obtained on Capitol Hill before selling
that information, or trading upon it). See generally Walker, supra note 10.
23. See Kenneth A. Gross, Unique Issues Facing Companies Under the STOCK
Act, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 3, 2012, 9:24 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/05/03/unique-issues-facing-companies-
under-the-stock-act/ (discussing the difficulties of applying insider trading principles
under the STOCK Act to political intelligence activities given a public official's unique
access to information and the official's duty to interact with constituents).
24. See Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal
Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.
L. & Bus. 151, 179 (2011) (considering that the materiality element of the
misappropriation theory is a high standard established by courts in order to protect
shareholders from useless information that is not conducive to informed decision-
making).
25. See id. at 180 (examining an alternative approach to determining the materiality
of market-sensitive information when material, nonpublic information pertains to
speculative matters similar to mergers, acquisitions, and bankruptcies).
26. See Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials, supra note 17, at 33-
35 (statement of Peter J. Henning, Professor of Law, Wayne State Univ. Law Sch.)
(hinting at the notion that the legislative process's unpredictable nature would best fit
the probability/magnitude materiality test).
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Applying the probability/magnitude test to legislative action in a
meaningful way, however, is problematic given the general uncertainty that
introduced legislation would eventually be enacted by Congress.27 Take
the 111th Congress' legislative record. Between 2009 and 2010, members
of Congress introduced 10,629 bills for consideration. 2 8 Only ten percent
of those bills underwent some form of legislative activity beyond simply
being referred to a committee. 2 9 Furthermore, only 366 laws were passed
in the 111th Congress, a mere thirty-six percent of bills that underwent
legislative activity beyond the committee level; ultimately, only three
percent of bills introduced in the 111th Congress became public law. 30
These statistics may reflect the numerous obstacles within the legislative
process, including necessary voting on the committee level and on each
chamber's floor, ' reconciliatory proceedings between both chambers,3 2
and a necessary signature or veto from the President.33 Furthermore, a host
of non-legislative factors may impact the legislative process, 34 making it
difficult to consider truly any one piece of political intelligence material on
its own. These realities of the legislative process would likely trigger the
"mosaic defense" against insider trading allegations,36 a shield based on the
legal rule that "an investor [who] assembles multiple pieces of non-material
information to reach a material conclusion has not violated insider trading
27. See Josh Tauberer, Kill Bill: How Many Bills Are There? How Many Are
Enacted?, GOVTRACK.US (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.govtrack.us/blog/2011/08/04/kill-
bill-how-many-bills-are-there-how-many-are-enacted/ (noting that the 111th Congress
enacted only three percent of legislation introduced).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See JOHN V. SULLIVAN, How OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. Doc. No. 110-49, at
37 (2007) (stating that after the House of Representatives has considered a bill the
"Senate committees give the bill the same detailed consideration as it received in the
House and may report it with or without amendment").
32. See id at 41-48 (detailing the conference process to reconcile conflicting bills
between the Senate and the House).
33. See generally id. at 50-51 (detailing the veto process within the larger
legislative process).
34. Benjamin I. Page & Robert Y. Shapiro, Effects of Public Opinion on Policy, 77
AM. POL. ScI. REV. 175, 186 (1983) (arguing that public opinion influences policy,
while acknowledging that there may very well be other influences, including world
events, interest group campaigns, and other exogenous factors).
35. See E-Alert: STOCK ACT Spotlights Trading on Government Information,
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 1, 5 (2012), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/
7f2980b7-4773-4b5b-b7bc-3b2e I Oaedb la/Presentation/PublicationAttachment
/fcfc6963-f48f-4320-al9e-416fba589ac3/STOCK Act SpotlightsTradingon
GovernmentInformation.pdf (noting that groups that engage Members of Congress
and their staff would likely acknowledge that information they obtained is not material
individually, although such an argument would not prevent prosecutorial action by the
SEC).
36. See id.
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laws, regardless of whether the information obtained was nonpublic."37
Considering the varying factors that affect the legislative process, and the
rarity that any political intelligence would be considered material
individually, applying the probability/magnitude standard to a piece of
political information may be an issue that would take years to resolve.38
B. The Nonpublic Element
Information is considered public when it has been dispersed widely
among investors with no special regard to any particular person or class.39
Even after such information has been disclosed, it is considered nonpublic
until it has been communicated so widely that stock prices reflect the
availability of such information.4 0 Furthermore, factors considered when
determining if information is nonpublic includes the following: (1) whether
the information is public through the Dow Jones business information
service; (2) whether the information has been disseminated through "wire
services, such as AP or Reuters, radio, television, or the Internet"; (3)
whether the information has been circulated through a general news service
(such as The Wall Street Journal or Business Week); and (4) whether the
information has been disclosed through public documents filed with the
SEC.4 1
Given the unique nature of information sharing that is encouraged within
the halls of Congress, the applicability of the nonpublic element will
remain a cumbersome legal issue for a number of reasons. 4 2 Congressional
committee meetings and hearings are an example of how Capitol Hill's
unique nature complicates the applicability of insider trading laws. Clause
2(g)(1) of Rule XI of the Rules of House of Representatives provides that
"[e]ach meeting for the transaction of business, including the mark up of
legislation, by a standing committee or subcommittee thereof (other than
the Committee on Ethics or its subcommittees) shall be open to the public,
37. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 24, at 154 (emphasis removed).
38. See COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, supra note 35, at 6.
39. See SEC v. Suman, 684 F. Supp. 2d 378, 388 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (synthesizing
case law in order to determine when information should be considered material,
nonpublic information).
40. See United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 898 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming a
district court's jury instruction that information is considered public after stock prices
have "an opportunity to 'absorb' the disclosed information . . .").
41. See CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDE TO INSIDER TRADING & REPRESENTATION §
18:4 (2012 ed.) (noting that tangible evidence that information has been disseminated
to investors serves as the best indicator of whether information should be considered
public).
42. Gross, supra note 23 (analyzing the difficulties of determining when
congressional information should be considered "public" or "nonpublic" given the
nature of communication on Capitol Hill).
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including to radio, television, and still photography coverage." 3 With a
few exceptions, mostly all official congressional committee meetings are
public, and many can be viewed live on television or the Internet.4
Although most congressional proceedings are accessible to the public, it
is unclear to what extent information obtained from such meetings is
considered "public" under our insider trading laws.45 Consider the
following real-life scenario. During the mid-2000's, Congress considered
legislative remedies for Americans who suffered from asbestos-related
injuries, which included establishing a $140 billion government-backed
trust fund for claims against manufacturers who used asbestos. 46 During
those proceedings, hedge funds employed "line sitters" and other political
intelligence operatives to hold seats at committee hearings.47 Given the
legislation's potential impact on the stock prices of companies with
asbestos-illness liability, political intelligence operatives were able to profit
from the information they obtained.4 8
Notwithstanding the theoretic public nature of congressional hearings,
attendees fortunate to reserve a space are privy to potentially market-
sensitive information before the larger American public. Therefore, in
practice, the larger American public would have to wait to obtain such
information through television access (if aired), news articles (if covered),
or word of mouth (if fortunate). Such information has the potential of
becoming worthless by the time it is well-known because of the ever-
changing nature of the market.4 9 Investors and political intelligence
operatives are left to wonder exactly when congressional information is
"public."50 Such a lack of clarity would leave market researchers with
43. KAREN L. HAAS, CLERK, H.R., 112TH CONG., RULES ON THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, R. XI, at 17-18 (2011).
44. See id. (providing official protocol that encourages public access to
congressional meetings and hearings).
45. Cf Gross, supra note 23 (pointing out that while televised congressional
proceedings would certainly be considered "public," an insider trading analysis of
political intelligence would be more difficult where proceedings are open to a smaller
number of persons, are not televised, or are conducted in private).
46. See Bud W. Jerke, Comment, Cashing in on Capitol Hill: Insider Trading and
the Use of Political Intelligence for Profit, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1451, 1453-54 (2010)
(noting the relevancy of mesothelioma cases to the political intelligence industry and
market participants).
47. See Political Intelligence Panel, supra note 1.
48. See Jerke, supra note 46, at 1453 (indicating that after asbestos legislation
narrowly passed the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2003, shares of USG Corporation,
a construction materials manufacturer, rose by 8.3% because the company had
asbestos-related tort liabilities).
49. See Sisira Kanti Mishra, Capital Market Efficiency 1 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1942820 (describing the nature of
efficient capital markets that adjust to new information).
50. See ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 10, at 3 (speculating about the STOCK
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* 51fewer incentives to seek out political intelligence.
III. CONSIDERING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY BASED ON COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES OF
FRAUD
In his dissent in Chiarella v. United States, Chief Justice Burger offered
an alternative approach to insider trading that holds liable those who
benefit from information "unlawfully converted for personal gain."52
According to Chief Justice Burger, whether trading on material, nonpublic
information is illegal should turn on whether an investor exploits an "ill-
gotten informational advantage." Consequently, this reading of Rule 1Ob-
5 allows a safe harbor for professionals who benefit from material
information that is not generally known, but was still acquired lawfully.54
Burger's reasoning in Chiarella has its roots in common law principles.55
Under the common law, whether a party has a duty to disclose information
during a business transaction should be determined, in part, by considering:
(1) whether the information is extrinsic or intrinsic to the transaction; (2)
whether there is an unusual difference in intelligence among transacting
parties; and (3) whether material, nonpublic information was obtained
illegally instead of through legitimate diligence.
An early example of how these principles may apply to political
intelligence activity can be found in the landmark Supreme Court case
Laidlaw v. Organ.57  In Laidlaw, two parties contracted for the sale of
tobacco.58  The buyer possessed what amounted to valuable political
Act's potential scope).
51. See Jerke, supra note 46, at 1518 (addressing the potential chilling effect on
congressional engagement if insider trading is expanded to regulate political
intelligence activities).
52. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 243 (1980) (5-4 decision)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (providing an alternative interpretation of insider trading
precedent and statutory language to provide legal room for market specialists to
perform their everyday functions).
53. See id at 245.
54. See id. at 242-43 ("[M]arket specialist would not be subject to a disclose-or-
refrain requirement in the performance of their everyday market functions. [In this
instance], trading is accomplished on the basis of material, nonpublic information, but
the information has not been unlawfully converted for personal gain.").
55. See Donald C. Langevoort, Words From On High About Rule 10b-5:
Chiarella's History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 865, 883 (1995)
(explaining how the reasoning in Burger's dissent in Chiarella has its roots in
principles established through common law).
56. See W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEX. L.
REv. 1, 34-35 (1936) (providing a number of factors that should be considered when
determining whether nondisclosure amounts to fraud).
57. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
58. See id
430 Vol. 2:2
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intelligence-information that indicated the War of 1812 had ended by way
of a treaty between the United States and England.59 Consequently, an
embargo was lifted, substantially raising the price of tobacco. 6 0 The Court
held that a party in a similar situation does not have a duty to disclose when
the information at question pertains to extrinsic circumstances, is equally
accessible, and has been obtained lawfully.6 1
The remainder of this Section will examine how these principles may be
applied to contemporary scenarios that are common in Washington.
A. Is the Political Intelligence Extrinsic or Intrinsic?
Under common law, whether information is material depends on the
extent to which the information is considered intrinsic.62 Intrinsic
information pertains to "the very ingredients" of a transaction; contrarily,
extrinsic information forms "no part of' the transaction, notwithstanding
the possibility that such information may very well induce a party into a
transaction. 63
For an illustration of how this principle may apply to political
intelligence, compare the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act with Title
X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank"). Both pieces of legislation pertained to the financial
markets.64 While the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act authorized
the Department of Treasury to purchase $700 billion in failed assets,
including mortgage-backed securities, 66 Title X of Dodd-Frank established
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, which has broader
authority.67 Possessing inside knowledge from the Hill or from the
59. See id. at 183.
60. See id. (noting the price of tobacco increased thirty to fifty percent).
61. See id. at 194.
62. See Keeton, supra note 56, at 20 (discussing fundamental common law
principles of fraud, including the general idea that intrinsic facts, more so than extrinsic
facts, should be disclosed during a transaction).
63. See id. (distinguishing circumstances that are extrinsic to a transaction from
those that are intrinsic).
64. Compare Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 115, 12 U.S.C. §§
5201-02 (Supp. IV 2011) (seeking "to restore liquidity and stability to the financial
system of the United States . . . ."), with Dodd-Frank Act § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491
(Supp. IV 2010) (creating an independent agency with oversight of consumer financial
products and services).
65. 12 U.S.C. § 5225.
66. See BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41427, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM (TARP): IMPLEMENTATION AND STATUS 2-3 (2012) (describing the Public-
Private Investment Program of the 2008 bailout program and its status at relieving
banks from failed mortgage-backed securities).
67. See DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42572, THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 1 (2012) (explaining that the newly established
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection has rulemaking power over "many consumer
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Treasury Department regarding which banks would be injected with bailout
money would certainly amount to intrinsic information under common
law.68 However, Title X's oversight of mortgage servicing pertained to
countless financial institutions, making inside knowledge of its broad
provisions extrinsic to the markets they affected. 9
B. Is There an Unusual Advantage?
The common law also disfavors unusual advantages in information.70
Consider private meetings where official legislative and executive business
is conducted. In the midst of the 2008 financial crisis, President George W.
Bush and congressional leaders negotiated on how $700 billion in federal
aid to the financial markets would be distributed." The meeting's
attendees included the House Speaker, the Senate Majority Leader,
chairmen of powerful committees, and the two presidential hopefuls, future
President Barack Obama and Arizona Senator John McCain.72 The
meeting was mostly a closed session, opening only for photographic
documentary and brief remarks from the President. In the event that an
insider with permission to attend became aware of the negotiated
agreements on the allocation of bailout funds, that insider would have an
unusual advantage in information.74 Under the common law, the
hypothetical insider may trigger a duty to disclose due to his unusual access
into closed White House proceedings.
financial products and services, as well as the entities that sell them").
68. Cf Keeton, supra note 56, at 20 (providing insight on what information should
be disclosed depending on the information's intrinsic nature).
69. Cf id. (defining extrinsic information as facts that are "accidentally connected
with" the essence of a transaction, rather than "bear[ing] upon it," even though that
information may very well affect pricing during a transaction).
70. See id at 34.
71. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Jeff Zeleny, With Debate Uncertain, Candidates
Meet with Bush, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/
us/politics/26debatecnd.html?pagewanted=all& r-0 (summarizing the proceedings
during the 2008 bailout meeting at the White House, a negotiation session that led to no
consensus).
72. See Mark Silva & Naftali Bendavid, The bailout parley: How it went down;
Tracing McCain and Obama's capital steps, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-09-26/news/0809251043_ljohn-mccain-
obama-campaign-john-boehner (describing the closed-door bailout meeting which
lasted for approximately fifty-seven minutes, ending with a lawmaker simply stating,
"[a]ll I can say is, we had an interesting meeting with the president and vice president,
Sen. Obama and Sen. McCain").
73. Id.
74. Cf Keeton, supra note 56, at 34 (explaining why using unusual advantages in
information suggests that a party has a greater duty to disclose his extraordinary
knowledge prior to a business transaction "simply because our sense of justice demands
it" to avoid fraud).
75. Cf id. (acknowledging that where information is equally accessible, and where
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C. Was the Information Obtained Through an Affirmative Deceitful
Act, or Is It a Product ofDiligence?
Common law disfavors investors who benefit from information obtained
illegally or deceptively.7 6 Consider congressional meetings, hearings, and
markups that are closed to the public.77 Some meetings regarding national
defense are conducted in private, and such legislative activity may also
have an impact on certain markets. If an investor intentionally
misrepresented herself as a congressional staff member to gain access to a
defense budget hearing, under the common law, that information should be
disclosed prior to a business transaction due to its illegal and deceptive
acquisition.79
Furthermore, under common law, an investor would be compelled to
prevent another's reliance on misrepresented material information that
investor learns to be false.80 Take the Supreme Court's recent ruling on the
Affordable Care Act ("ACA"). After the ruling was released and
confirmed, stock prices in hospital companies increased, while those in
insurance companies fell immediately. 1 While the ruling was being
announced, however, there were conflicting reports by news media on how
the Court ruled on the ACA's individual mandate.8 2 Although there were
reports stating that the Court overturned the individual mandate, those
diligent effort would make it attainable to anyone, an unfair advantage does not exist,
regardless of the number of people with such knowledge).
76. See id. at 35 (explaining that the manner in which information is acquired may
determine whether disclosure is legally required).
77. See HAAS, supra note 43.
78. See, e.g., Jeremy Herb, Defense Contractors Hesitate Over Issuing Layoff
Notices Before Election, THE HILL (Sept. 9, 2012, 5:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/industry/248313-defense-contractors-hesitate-over-
layoff-notices-before-election (noting that major defense contractors have threatened
layoffs in fear of automatic budget cuts looming at the end of the 112th Congress if a
budget deal is not met).
79. Cf Keeton, supra note 56, at 35 (suggesting that information that affects the
value of the subject-matter of a transaction should be disclosed when obtained by an
illegal act).
80. Cf id. at 6 (elaborating on how the common law disfavors a party continuing
misrepresentations when they are aware of the falsehood and have an opportunity to
prevent reliance thereon).
81. See Supreme Court's Health Care Ruling Touches Stock Market, Political
Campaigns, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 28, 2012, available at
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/06/supreme courtshealth care rul
1.html (discussing the financial impact of the Supreme Court's 2012 health care
ruling).
82. See Brian Stelter, CNN and Fox Trip Up in Rush to Get the News on the Air,
N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/cnn-and-foxs-
supreme-court-mistake.html (describing how some media outlets incorrectly reported
the Supreme Court's 2012 health care ruling).
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reports were false. Consistent with common law principles of fraud, once
media officials realized they reported inaccurate information on the ACA's
ruling, they assumed a duty to disclose accurate information or abstain
from trading, if they were involved in trading impacted by the ruling.84
Such active concealment during a business transaction is fraudulent as a
matter of law.
IV. MOVING FORWARD: HOW THE STOCK ACT CAN BE MADE
MORE FUNCTIONAL BY APPLYING COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES TO
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY
While the STOCK Act directs Congress's ethics committees, the U.S.
Office of Government Ethics, and the Judicial Conference of the United
States to provide interpretive guidance to individuals working within the
three branches of government, the Act has little to say about outsiders
who engage government officers and employees daily.87  Accordingly,
political intelligence professionals have been left to speculate on how their
profession fits under the STOCK Act's authority.88
Moving forward, Congress, the SEC, or both should take action. While
Congress should clarify its intent in enacting the STOCK Act, the SEC
should provide interpretive guidance on how its securities laws apply to
political intelligence activity. Either way, both Congress and the SEC
should consider fundamental principles of fraud established under common
law and alluded to in Chief Justice Burger's Chiarella dissent.89 While
political intelligence obtained through affirmative misrepresentations or
illegal acts should have no place in the financial markets, political
intelligence acquired through "exceptional knowledge, skill, or effort"
should be permissible.90  Such permission would incentivize the
exploration of political information, which may in turn encourage a more
efficient market place.91
83. See id. (detailing the confusion surrounding the Supreme Court's decision on
the health care ruling).
84. Cf Keeton, supra note 56, at 36 (considering the question of whether an
affirmative action prevented a party from discovering information as a factor used to
determine fraud).
85. Cf id. at 37 ("The active concealment of anything that might prevent the
purchaser from buying at the price agreed on, is, and should be, as a matter of law
fraudulent.").
86. STOCK Act §§ 3, 9.
87. See id.
88. See generally ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, supra note 10, at 4-5.
89. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 243-44 (1980); Langevoort,
supra note 55, at 883.
90. See Keeton, supra note 56, at 26.
91. See Jerke, supra note 46, at 1520 ("Mining nonpublic information does not
simply help the direct recipient of the information, but encourages accuracy of prices,
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CONCLUSION
Professor W. Page Keeton once noted that "a decision on a particular
state of facts may be desirable today, whereas the same decision a hundred
years from now might be undesirable as not sub-serving the best interests
of society." 92 The legal community is in a similar situation today as it
attempts to apply traditional insider trading principles to a relatively new
phenomenon-the commodification of political intelligence. Accordingly,
Congress and the SEC should approach the political intelligence industry
cautiously, considering the practicality of applying traditional insider
principles to a profession that furthers favorable market research. As this
Note suggests, there may be value in considering fundamental principles of
fraud established under common law, hinted to by Chief Justice Burger in
his Chiarella dissent. Nonetheless, this very debate may be an indicator
that lawmakers should consider overhauling our insider-trading regime
altogether. Indeed, the expansion of traditional insider trading principles to
cover political activity signals a clear policy shift from 1934 to the present.
Comprehensive reform and a clear indication of legislative intent may be
needed to avoid the risk of uncertainty among participants within our
capital markets.
efficiency of markets, and protection of all investors.").
92. Cf Keeton, supra note 56, at 34.
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